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*
This paper examines the empirical relationship between trade and total factor
productivity (TFP) in South Africa. Using data on actual trade protection across
different manufacturing sectors, it is shown that trade liberalization had a positive
impact on TFP growth during the 1990s. In addition, time-series evidence on
macro data supports a positive long-run relationship between TFP and openness.
[JEL F14, F43, O40]
T
he pendulum of academic research on the positive relationship between trade
and economic growth appears to be swinging from near universal to more qual-
ified acceptance.1 The spate of cross-country empirical evidence—marshaled by
Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Edwards (1998)—that asserts the posi-
tive impact of trade on economic growth has recently been questioned, most notably
by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). While not arguing for the converse proposition,
namely, that trade has a negative impact on growth, they assert that earlier authors
did not consistently and reliably (in a statistical sense) demonstrate the regularity in
the observed data. A reading of the literature yields the impression that the recent
skepticism is an outgrowth of a more generalized dissatisfaction with the cross-
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1Throughout this paper, the term “trade” will encompass two distinct concepts: the first, trade liber-
alization, will denote explicitly the reduction of domestic trade policy barriers, while the second, open-
ness, will refer to trade outcomes.Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
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country approach per se (see, e.g., Srinivasan, 1997), which therefore argues for a
research strategy that focuses on exploring more contingent or situation-specific
relationships. This paper attempts to do this for the particular case of South Africa. 
More specifically, this paper examines the empirical relationship between trade
and total factor productivity (TFP) in South Africa, where the hypothesis is that
enhanced trade in recent years has improved efficiency in the South African economy.
The study would be important from a policy perspective, as trade liberalization consti-
tutes an important element in the government’s efforts to boost the underlying supply
capacity of the economy. But in light of the ambiguity of the empirical results
described above, it would also be interesting from a research perspective to see
whether and how the South African experience differs from that of other countries. 
Moreover, South Africa affords the possibility of an interesting case study on
account of a rich variation in trade policy orientation and productivity perfor-
mance across the manufacturing sectors and to a similar rich variation in degree
of openness over time owing both to external sanctions and trade liberalization.
The availability of disaggregated data—on capital stock, employment, and trade
policy—also permits such questions to be examined. Thus, a distinctive feature of
the paper is that the issue of trade and TFP growth is examined from both a cross-
section and a time-series perspective. 
I. Previous Research
In theoretical models, the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is
either absent or ambiguous. In a conventional neoclassical growth model, trade
does not affect the equilibrium or steady-state rate of output growth because, by
assumption, growth is determined by an exogenously given technological
progress.2 In two-sector models of this kind, trade policy affects the allocation of
resources between sectors and, hence, the steady-state level of savings and capital
accumulation. This can have a one-off effect on the steady-state level of output
(which can be positive or negative depending on how savings and capital accu-
mulation are affected by trade policy) but not on the rate of growth. Nevertheless,
even in the neoclassical model, trade policy can have transitional growth effects
as the economy converges toward the steady state.3
However, in endogenous growth models, the impact of trade liberalization on
output growth can be positive or negative, depending on model-specific assump-
tions. Increased trade can have a number of generalized positive impacts.4 For
example, trade enables a country (i) to employ a larger variety of intermediate
2In static models without market imperfections (such as monopolistic market structures, internal and
external economies of scale, or other distortions), trade restrictions reduce the level of real GDP (equiva-
lent to welfare when measured at world prices). The presence of imperfections opens up a plethora of
possibilities in which the effects of trade policies are typically indeterminate, depending on the prior
distortion (see Bhagwati, 1971).  
3The distinction between the transitional path and the steady state is well-defined in theory, but less
easily applied empirically. If transitions are sufficiently long, the actual data could  exhibit growth effects
from trade policy changes.
4See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991), and the references therein.goods and capital equipment which could enhance the productivity of its other
resources; (ii) to acquire technology developed worldwide, especially in the form
of embodied capital goods; (iii) to increase the variety of products produced and
consumed; and (iv) to improve the efficiency with which resources are used, which
can help to change market structures and reduce markups, thereby imparting
dynamic efficiency benefits (Levinsohn, 1992). However, the impact of trade
policy changes cannot be unambiguously signed. If the resource allocation effects
of trade policy changes promote sectors or activities that generate more long-run
growth, the impact is positive, and negative otherwise. The question, then, is really
an empirical one of determining the impact of trade policy in specific cases.
The empirical evidence on trade and economic growth has two distinct
strands. The first and perhaps the largest is based on cross-country studies—see,
for example, Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben-David (1993),
Edwards (1998), and Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997).5 This literature has
focused either on the direct impact of trade on growth in output (the first three
studies) or in TFP (the last two studies). While all of these studies reach the broad
conclusion that increased trade has a positive impact on growth, they have now
been critically reviewed by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and Rodrik (1999), who
call their results into question. 
The critique can be thought of as comprising the following elements: first, that
the really meaningful question to ask is not whether openness, defined in terms of
outcomes, helps growth but whether more liberal trade policy helps growth. In this
view, the trade outcome approach suffers from conceptual and empirical short-
comings, including the endogeneity of outcomes, the failure to specify the mech-
anism through which exports and imports affect growth, and measurement
problems. Second, that recent prominent studies do not incontrovertibly support
the positive relationship between trade policy and growth either because they
mismeasure trade policy (Dollar, 1992), or that the trade policy variable they
employ is actually picking up other effects such as macroeconomic stability or
regional dummies (Sachs and Warner, 1995), or because their results are not robust
to alternative specifications (Edwards, 1998).
The second strand in the empirical literature comprises intra-country studies
based either on plant-level data or industry-level data.6 Although it is difficult to
summarize the results of this strand of literature, it indicates that the causal link
between trade and total factor productivity is less evident in the data. For example,
Harrison (1994) finds that, while TFP growth and trade policy orientation do not
appear to be correlated at the industry level, a correlation can be detected when
TFP is measured appropriately by taking into account the biases emanating from
the presence of nonconstant returns to scale and imperfect competition. Bernard
and Jensen (1999) suggest that while efficiency and trade orientation are corre-
lated, the causation appears to run from the former to the latter in the sense that
efficient firms tend to self-select into export markets rather than openness leading
to increased efficiency. Finally, one of the few papers that examines the empirical
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5Edwards (1993) surveys trade and growth studies covering the 1970s and 1980s.
6See, for example, Tybout (1992), Bernard and Jensen (1999), and Harrison (1994). relationship between trade and growth from a time-series perspective is Coe and
Moghadam (1993) for the case of France. They find a robust long-run relationship
among growth, factor inputs, and openness (which is intended to capture the
effects of total factor productivity).
II. Trade Policy and Trade Developments in South Africa
Trade Policy Prior to the 1990s
Trade policy, or rather, trade protection has played an important role not only in
South Africa’s economy but also in the country’s politics. The appeal of economic
self-sufficiency—that pervaded the developing world during the 1960s and
1970s—was heightened in the case of South Africa by political imperatives. Self-
sufficiency was seen as a necessary precautionary response to an “inimical”
external world that could—and eventually did—cut off supplies to the country. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa’s trade regime was characterized by
high tariffs and extensive import controls, including through formal import quotas.
In response to the perception that growth through import substitution was being
exhausted and in the wake of declining manufacturing production and trade,
attempts were made to mitigate the anti-export bias of the system. Formal import
quotas gave way to import licensing, but the focus, however, was on export promo-
tion measures. Beginning in 1983, the first systematic attempt was made to elim-
inate import licensing which then covered 77 percent of imports. In 1985, South
Africa switched from a positive list of permitted imports (i.e., imports not subject
to licensing) to a negative list of prohibited imports covering about 23 percent of
imports so that more than three quarters of imports were exempt from licensing
(see GATT, 1993). 
However, with the imposition of financial sanctions and the debt standstill in
1985, balance of payments pressures halted, and even reversed, progress on trade
liberalization. An import surcharge of 10 percent was introduced in 1985, which
was increased to 60 percent on some items in 1988, and by 1990 there were three
rates (10 percent, 15 percent, and 40 percent) for the surcharge. During the 1980s,
a number of export schemes were introduced to alleviate the burden on exporters.
In 1990, these were consolidated into one scheme—the Generalized Export
Incentive Scheme (GEIS)—that provided a tax-free subsidy to exporters related to
the value of exports, the degree of processing of the exported product, the extent
of local content embodied in exports, and the degree of overvaluation of the
exchange rate.
By 1992, only 15 percent of tariff lines in the manufacturing sector were
subject to import licensing which had become virtually automatic and hence
less restrictive. Only agriculture (74 percent of tariff lines) and five manufac-
turing sectors—food, beverages, rubber, and tobacco (about 90 percent) and
clothing (59 percent)—remained subject to licensing (GATT, 1993). The tariff
regime was highly complex. By the end of the 1980s, South Africa had the most
tariff lines (greater than 13,000), most tariff rates (200 ad valorem equivalent
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200rates), the widest range of tariffs, and the second highest level of dispersion (as
measured by the coefficient of variation) among developing countries (see
Belli, Finger, and Ballivian, 1993). In sum, South Africa had a highly distorted
system of protection (see Table 1). 
Trade Policy in the 1990s
The impetus for liberalization started gaining momentum in the early 1990s,
reflected in a consultative process under the auspices of the tripartite National
Economic Forum involving government, labor, and organized business. As a
result, South Africa adopted a two-pronged approach to trade liberalization during
the 1990s. These included (i) unilateral trade liberalization and (ii) multilateral
trade liberalization in the context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
Unilateral trade liberalization, 1990–94
Between 1990 and 1994, trade liberalization largely took the form of eliminating
the remaining import licensing procedures that were in place and reducing import
tariffs. The average tariff was reduced from 28 percent to 16 percent while the
import surcharge was eliminated. Thus, the sum of all charges on imports was
reduced from 34 percent to 16 percent.
Unilateral trade liberalization, 1994–98
South Africa announced, in 1994, a schedule of unilateral tariff liberalization
expiring in 1999 that went beyond the Uruguay Round commitments. As a result,
its average (import-weighted) tariffs in manufacturing declined from 16 percent in
1994 to 10 percent in 1998. The current average (import-weighted) tariff is below
the level committed by South Africa in the WTO by more than 5 percentage
points,7 although the “water in the tariff” varies considerably between sectors. 
As a result of these changes, South Africa’s trade regime has been consider-
ably liberalized since the early 1990s. Virtually all quantitative restrictions have
been eliminated, including those operating through agricultural marketing boards;
the tariff regime has been rationalized, with the number of lines having been
reduced from over 13,000 in 1990 to about 7,900 in 1998 and the number of tariff
bands having been reduced from well over 200 to 72. In addition, the tariff regime
was simplified, as the number of lines carrying formula duties (which acted like
variable import levies) was reduced from 1,900 in 1993 to 28 in 1997, and the
number of lines facing specific tariffs was reduced from 500 to 227, respectively.
Multilateral trade liberalization, 1995–2002
In the context of the Uruguay Round, South Africa made a tariff offer phased over
five years that took effect on January 1, 1995 (except in the case of three sectors
DYNAMIC GAINS FROM TRADE
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7The average bound tariff in the WTO in 2004 will be about 16 percent.where the reductions were phased over a longer period, see below). This offer was
publicly announced in 1994 after extensive consultations with civil society within
South Africa. Given the prior progress with liberalizing the quantitative restric-
tions, the offer, particularly in the manufacturing sector, was focused on tariffs.
The offer aimed to:
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Table 1. South Africa: Trade Regime, 1990 and 1998




Maximum tariff 1,389 72
Average import-weighted tariff 28 10
Average unweighted tariff 30 14
Number of tariff bands > 200 72
Standard deviation 43 15
Number of tariff lines1 >13,000 7,814
Percent of tariff lines with non–ad valorem duties1 28 26
Range of effective protection2 189 to –411 204 to –2
Average import-weighted surcharge3 60
Import surcharge bands  10, 15, and 40 Eliminated
Agriculture
Average tariff 25 2.2
Average import surcharge  8 0
Export subsidy4 17 Eliminated
Export taxes
Diamonds 15 15
Quantitative restrictions on imports5 15 Virtually eliminated
of which:
Agriculture 74 Virtually eliminated
Manufacturing 14 Virtually eliminated
Quantitative restrictions on exports; goods3 Diamonds Diamonds
21 agricultural commodities
Memorandum items:
Trade tax revenue as share of total revenue 7.9 4.0
Import taxes as share of imports 10.8 4.1
Export subsidies as a share of GDP 0.3 0.0
Sources: GATT (1993); WTO (1998); IDC South Africa; and Belli, Finger, and Ballivian (1993).
1The figure for 1998 refers to June 1997.
2At ISIC three-digit level; excludes import surcharge.
3The figure for 1990 refers to 1992.
4Actual subsidy disbursements were 2.7 percent of exports in 1990/91.
5The figure for 1990 refers to 1992. As percent of total tariff lines (other than those maintained
for health, security, and environmental reasons).• reduce the number of tariff lines (from over 13,000) at the six-digit level by
15 percent in the first year and by 30 percent or higher by 1999;
• convert all quantitative restrictions (QRs) on agricultural imports to bound ad
valorem rates; lower all bound agricultural tariffs by 21 percent on average
and reduce export subsidies by 36 percent;
• increase the number of bindings8 on industrial products from 55 percent to 98
percent; replace formula duties with tariffs; and reduce the number of tariff
rates to six—0, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 percent rates—with the exception of the
“sensitive” industries (textiles, clothing, and motor vehicles);
• liberalize the sensitive industries over an eight-year period; and
• phase out the General Export Incentive Scheme by 1997.9
Figure 1 depicts tariff levels and their changes in the different manufacturing
sectors during the 1990s. Tariff levels varied considerably across sectors. In 1990,
many of the sectors producing inputs (equipment, iron and steel, and chemicals)
faced the lowest tariffs, while sectors producing consumer goods such as textiles
and clothing, footwear, and automotive products faced very high tariffs. Tariff cuts
during the subsequent years also varied considerably across manufacturing
sectors. In general, sectors with the highest tariffs in 1990 witnessed the largest
cuts between 1990 and 1998. However, these sectors will continue to be the most
protected even after the current phase of tariff reductions is implemented.
To summarize, during our focus period, 1990–98, liberalization of the trade
regime for manufacturing products resulted in: the elimination of the few quanti-
tative restrictions that remained; reduction in the average tariff (including all
charges) from 34 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 1998; considerable variation in
tariff cuts across sectors; and simplification of the tariff regime. 
Sanctions and Trade Developments
One important feature of the economic landscape in the 1980s was the imposition
of trade and financial sanctions on South Africa. While capital flight from South
Africa dates back to the early 1960s, more concerted action by creditors was
precipitated in 1985 when a U.S. bank announced that it would not be rolling over
its short-term loans to South Africa. Other U.S. banks followed suit, causing a full-
blown liquidity crisis for the South African economy. The South African authori-
ties responded by imposing exchange controls and a moratorium on payments to
foreign creditors. By the mid to late 1980s, spurred by action in the United States,
the Nordic countries, and within the Commonwealth, South Africa faced formal
sanctions on its exports of coal, iron and steel, uranium, and agricultural products
to a number of industrial countries, and on its imports of petroleum, computer, and
high-technology (including nuclear) equipment.
DYNAMIC GAINS FROM TRADE
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8A binding represents a legal commitment to not raise tariffs beyond the level embodied in the binding.
9The GEIS was altered in 1995 in two ways: the magnitude of support was scaled down, and
payments under it were made taxable. In 1996, the GEIS was limited to fully manufactured products, and
















































































Figure 1. Tariff Protection, 1990–98
(In percent)Financial sanctions forced South Africa to move from running current account
deficits in the early 1980s of over 5 percent of GDP to current account surpluses
until the early 1990s.10 It is less clear, however, whether financial and trade sanc-
tions had a significant impact on South Africa’s trading possibilities—either in
reducing the actual volume of trade and/or worsening the terms of trade (which
could have been the cost of evading the sanctions).11 Trade data suggest that the
impact on trade volumes may not have been significant. Imports actually grew
somewhat during the late 1980s, although it accelerated sharply after the removal
of sanctions. Likewise, exports increased during the sanctions, and picked-up
strongly in the 1990s. 
III. Methodology and Data
As indicated in Section I, some of the empirical studies have focused on the deter-
minants of growth in TFP rather than in real GDP. The advantage with such an
approach is that there is a stronger presumption that growth in TFP is positively
related to trade. As discussed above, trade policy might also affect factor accumu-
lation, but in ways that are theoretically ambiguous, and a study focusing exclu-
sively on output growth would be unable to isolate and capture the effects working
through increased efficiency. Thus, in the current study we examine the impact of
trade on TFP growth rather than output growth. 
The cross-section analysis is based on pooled data for the years 1990–94 and
1994–98 for 24 manufacturing industries (defined at the ISIC 3-digit level). TFP
growth was defined as the difference between growth in real value added and real
factor accumulation in each sector, with the factor shares—obtained from
industry-specific data—used to weight the growth in factors (see Appendix for
further details). Figure 2 shows the TFP growth in the 24 manufacturing sectors
during the 1990s. It can be noticed that the growth rates tended to be higher after
1994, but also that there was substantial variation in the TFP growth rates across
sectors.
The trade variable (Tariff) is a policy variable, namely, the sum of all import
charges (tariff and import surcharge) for each sector. The variable DTariff is
measured as the change in tariff divided by 1 plus the initial tariff and, hence,
reflects the percentage change in domestic price owing to the tariff reduction.12
Data on tariffs (and all other import charges) were available for the years 1990,
1994, and 1998, although for three sectors (textiles, clothing, and motor vehicles)
the announced tariffs for 2002 were used, rather than the actual 1998 tariffs, in
order to capture any forward-looking behavior.13
That we do not take into account some of the quantitative restrictions that were
eliminated during the period 1990–94 could lead to some mismeasurement of our
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10During the late 1970s, South Africa ran current account surpluses, but this was due to the sharp
improvement in the terms of trade associated with a boom in gold prices.
11See Lipton (1988) for a more elaborate discussion of this issue.
12All variables beginning with the operator “D” refer to the change in the underlying variable.
13As explained in Section II, under the Uruguay Round commitments, South Africa announced tariff
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Figure 2. TFP Growth, 1990–98
(Annual percentage change)trade policy variable for this period. However, as noted above, the QRs that did
remain in place were small in magnitude and “soft” in terms of their impact as they
took the form of automatic import licensing. Moreover, the sectors in which
import licensing remained and were eliminated were also the ones that saw the
greatest tariff reductions; hence our measure for tariff changes would be highly
correlated with a broader measure that took into account the vestigial import
restrictions. Our trade policy variable, of course, does not capture the improve-
ments stemming from the reduction in complexity of the tariff regime, but our
results should not be overly affected by these changes unless there is reason to
believe that their impact was different across manufacturing sectors.14
The time-series variations in the data were examined for the period 1971–97.15
Total factor productivity growth was calculated as the growth in private nonagri-
cultural GDP less the growth in capital and labor, weighted by their respective
shares in output derived from the national income accounts (see Subramanian,
1998).16 Openness was measured as the ratio of the sum of real imports and real
exports of goods and nonfactor services to real GDP.17 The use of this variable is
open to the criticism that it measures an outcome and, hence, may not have policy
implications. The preferred estimation strategy in this view would be to use direct
measures of trade policy. However, it is difficult to compute a reliable series of
“trade policy” over the sample period, especially because of the pervasiveness of
nontariff barriers until the late 1980s.
Time series data for R&D in South Africa are not easily available. However,
following De Long and Summers (1991), we used the share of investment in
equipment and machinery in total investment as the proxy for technology. Insofar
as South Africa does not undertake significant amounts of R&D activity, we would
expect the bulk of the R&D to be embodied in capital equipment, especially that
imported from abroad. By looking at total investment in machinery and equip-
ment, our specification implicitly aggregates R&D undertaken at home and abroad
and assumes that the two have similar effects on TFP. An alternative approach that
could have disentangled the effects of foreign and domestic R&D would have been
to use separate measures for domestic and imported capital goods (or even
construct an imported R&D variable à la Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997),
but this course was rendered difficult by the absence of data on imported capital
goods for the entire sample period. 
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14Although we had data on effective protection, we chose not to use them for three reasons: first, the
data were based on statutory tariffs alone and did not incorporate the impact of the import surcharges,
which varied substantially across sectors; second, the effective protection data series contained a few
outliers, which raised doubts about its accuracy; and third, nominal protection has a more natural metric
and is therefore more easily interpretable.
15See Appendix for data description and sources.
16The time-series analysis was also carried out using an alternative methodology for computing TFP
growth based on Sarel (1997).  The results obtained were very similar to those reported in the next section
(see Jonsson and Subramanian, 2000).
17As alternatives, we used this ratio in nominal terms, as well as the ratio of exports and imports of
goods alone to GDP; the results were similar but less robust.We also tried alternative specifications, including a proxy for human capital,
but we dropped these subsequently as the proxy was likely mismeasured.18
Similarly, exogenous influences, such as terms of trade developments and the
aggregate capital-labor ratio, were initially included in the analysis, but they did
not turn out to be important.19
IV. Results
Cross-Section Evidence
This section focuses on how variations in TFP growth across 24 different manufac-
turing sectors are related to tariff reductions during the period 1990–98. More
precisely, TFP growth across manufacturing sectors for the two sub-periods
1990–94 and 1994–98 are explained in terms of the trade policy changes during
these sub-periods. Compared to the time-series analysis discussed below, there are
three advantages with this approach: first, the problem in separating true technolog-
ical progress from aggregate demand-related effects is mitigated, as aggregate
shocks are likely to affect all sectors. Similarly, the effect of the lifting of sanctions
and its impact on TFP growth, which may be inadequately captured in the time-
series analysis, is less of a problem in the cross-section analysis, unless sanctions
had a differential impact across manufacturing sectors. Second, the number of obser-
vations for measuring the long-run effects is greatly increased. Finally, the indepen-
dent variable is actual trade policy (import tariffs) rather than trade outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to measure trade policy—both conceptually20
and empirically—at the aggregate level. However, in the cross-section analysis, we
have a fair degree of confidence that we accurately measure the trade policy variable:
we include all the charges on imports (surcharges and tariffs); we do not have to worry
about the effect of quantitative restrictions as those in manufacturing were virtually
eliminated before 1990; and we also measure the impact of the export subsidies. 
Table 2 reports the results from regressions of TFP growth on changes in tariffs
(DTariff). To ensure that this effect was not picking up the impact of other variables,
we included four additional variables: the capital-labor ratio (CLR), the share of
exports in total domestic production (Exportshare), the share of imports in total
domestic sales (Importshare), and the initial level of Tariff. The square values of the
levels and changes in tariffs were also included in one specification to test for any
nonlinear effects. The regression was pooled over the periods 1990–94 and 1994–98,
and all regressors, except for DTariff, were measured at their initial level in 1990 and
Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
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18The Nehru-Swanson-Dubey (1995) human capital stock series does not cover South Africa. The
Barro-Lee (1997) series does cover South Africa but exhibits anomalous movements that raise doubts
about its quality. In private correspondence, the authors agreed that this series required further refinement.
19Macroeconomic policy could also have been considered as a possible determinant of TFP growth,
but we chose to ignore it as this variable in general is more important in influencing capital accumulation
than TFP growth (see Collins and Bosworth, 1996).
20There are well-known problems relating to finding a scalar measure that successfully aggregates
protection across sectors. One exception is the measure developed by Anderson and Neary (1994), but its
data requirements are fairly onerous.1994, respectively. A time-dummy for the second subperiod (Dum9498) was included,
implying that the results are mainly driven by cross-sectional variations in the data.
The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between changes
in tariffs and TFP growth across the manufacturing sectors, and this result is robust to
the inclusion of the other variables that are possibly important for TFP growth.21 Of
these variables, only CLR enters significantly, indicating that more capital intensive
sectors tend to exhibit higher TFP growth rates. The initial level of the tariff, and the
DYNAMIC GAINS FROM TRADE
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Table 2. Trade Liberalization and TFP Growth
(Pooled results, 1990–94 and 1994–98)
Dependent Variable: DTFP
Constant –3.96 –4.39 –5.35 –5.93
[–3.18] [–3.56] [–3.36] [–2.85]
Dum9498 2.89 2.69 3.11 3.28
[2.64] [2.79] [2.72] [2.87]
CLR 0.01 0.01 0.01
[2.39] [2.23] [2.33]
Exportshare –0.07 –0.08 –0.07
[–0.90] [–0.95] [–0.80]






DTariff –0.17 –0.16 –0.48 –0.59
[–2.17] [–2.65] [–2.15] [–2.85]
DTariff–sq 0.02 0.03
[1.67] [2.59]
R-square 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.33
Number of obs. 48 48 48 48
Note: OLS estimations; the t-statistics (in brackets) are based on a heteroskedastic-consistent
covariance matrix, see White (1980).
21Our results are susceptible to a potential endogeneity problem.  It is conceivable that the sectors that
exhibited faster TFP growth were the ones that would have been politically easier to liberalize and hence
selected for deeper tariff cuts.  In other words, TFP growth may have determined tariff cuts rather than the
other way around.  However, this argument is empirically implausible because the tariff changes were
announced and made in advance of changes in TFP, which the authorities could not have reasonably and
accurately predicted.  In fact, the only pattern discernible in the tariff actions seems to be that larger reduc-
tions took place in sectors with high initial tariffs.degree of export orientation of, and import penetration in, a sector, appear to be less
important in explaining TFP growth rates. 
It is also interesting to notice that tariff changes seem to have a nonlinear
effect on TFP growth; the marginal effect on TFP growth tends to decline as the
tariff reductions become larger. One possible explanation is that this nonlinear
impact simply reflects some exogenous limit to TFP growth within the estimated
four-year period. These results are illustrated in Figure 3, where the conditional
TFP growth is shown on the y-axis. The figure (and the regression results) also
illustrate that the quantitative effect of trade liberalization is sizeable; for example,
the results indicate that the annual growth rate in TFP was nearly 3 percentage
points higher in sectors where tariffs were reduced by 10 percent (or rather, where
the price reduction was 10 percent due to tariff reductions) compared with sectors
where tariffs were unchanged.
Table 3 depicts the results for the estimations for the two different subperiods,
1990–94 and 1994–98, respectively. It can be noted that the estimated coefficients
on DTariff are negative and significant in both subperiods, but that the quantitative
effect is somewhat stronger in the latter subperiod. In this subperiod, it was also
possible to examine the lagged effects of changes in tariffs on TFP growth.
However, the coefficients on these lagged variables were small and insignificant.
For the second subperiod we also tested whether changes in the export subsidy
affected TFP growth.22 The export subsidy variable was positively signed
(implying that reductions in the GEIS could have adversely affected TFP growth)
but insignificant.23 More importantly, the inclusion of the export subsidy variable
does not affect the coefficient of the tariff change variable.
The robustness of the results was examined in several ways. First, to test the
sensitivity of the results to individual sectors, 24 additional regressions were run
in which the observations from a single sector were dropped alternatively. The
estimated coefficient on DTariff always remained negative and significant at the
5-percent level, except in one case where it remained significant at the 10-percent
level. Second, to test whether the impact of trade liberalization was confined to
the import competing sector, the observations for the two most export oriented
sectors were excluded; again the results remained broadly unaffected by this
reduction in the sample. Also, various measures of the extent to which a sector is
a net exporter were included in the regressions. This variable was added sepa-
rately (as an alternative to Exportshare and Importshare) but also interacted with
DTariff. Neither of these coefficients turned out to be significant, but the esti-
mated coefficient on DTariff remained negative and significant. Finally, the
average capacity utilization of individual sectors was included in the regressions
to capture the possibility of idiosyncratic shocks affecting TFP growth differen-
Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
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22It should be recalled that over the first sample period, 1990–94, the export subsidy remained
broadly unchanged.
23One point on the measurement of the export subsidy should be noted. On the one hand, the subsidy
provided effective protection to those sectors that received it; on the other hand, insofar as the subsidy was
linked to the use of locally produced inputs, its effect was diluted (on the reasonable assumption that the
local content requirement was binding). It is not clear that the manner in which the subsidy is measured
adequately captures the latter effect.DYNAMIC GAINS FROM TRADE
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DTFP|(CLR, Exp, Imp, Dum 9498) = a + b(DTariff)
DTFP|(CLR, Exp, Imp, Dum 9498) = a + b(DTariff) + c(DTariff-sq)


























Figure 3. Conditional TFP Growth and Tariff Changestially across sectors. This variable was not significant and it did not affect the
importance of the tariff change variable.
While the results thus far appear strong, it is possible that they are driven by
the impact of trade liberalization on employment. If this impact is negative, TFP
growth may have increased because firms have fired less productive workers as
tariffs were reduced in order to stay competitive. This is an important issue to
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Table 3. Trade Liberalization and TFP Growth; 
Results for Subperiods 
Dependent Variable: DTFP 
1990–94 1994–98
Constant –2.03 –0.69 –4.16 –4.34 –4.64 –2.22
[–1.96] [–0.17] [–2.78] [–2.21] [–2.14] [–1.05]
CLR 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[–0.04] [–0.02] [3.52] [3.75] [3.46] [2.38]
Exportshare –0.19 –0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
[–1.95] [–1.93] [0.50] [0.48] [0.57] [0.45]
Importshare 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03





DTariff –0.43 –0.46 –0.63 –0.51 –0.63 –0.74
[–2.57] [–1.75] [–2.77] [–2.02] [–2.18] [–3.57]
DTariff–sq 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02







R-square 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.43
Number of obs. 24 24 24 24 24 24
Note: OLS estimations; the t-statistics (in brackets) are based on a heteroskedastic consistent
covariance matrix (see White (1980)).clarify in the case of South Africa because employment fell almost continuously
during the 1990s; in the manufacturing sector, employment fell in 18 of the 24
sectors examined in this study between 1990–98. However, although this is a plau-
sible hypothesis, the data do not lend support to it. 
Table 4 reports regression results similar to those discussed above, but in
which the dependent variable is employment growth, capital growth, or the growth
in capital intensity (C/L), rather than TFP growth. There is no evidence for the
hypothesis that the tariff reductions are positively related to the employment
decline across the manufacturing sectors. In fact, the coefficient on DTariff is
negatively signed, indicating that, if anything, employment has fallen less in the
sectors where tariffs have been reduced more aggressively.24 Instead, it can be
noticed that capital growth is positively related to changes in tariffs. This result
suggests that in sectors that experienced larger tariff reductions, firms have tended
to use the existing capital stock more efficiently. Taken together, the data reveal
that capital intensity increased more in the sectors that remained relatively highly
protected (i.e., where tariffs were reduced less) during the 1990s, rather than the
opposite. 
Time-Series Evidence
This section provides time-series results that corroborate the cross-sectional
evidence. A cursory examination of the data indicates that both total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) and openness (Open) increased during the 1990s (see Figure 4).
Following the discussion in Section III, a series of machinery and equipment
investment in total investment (MachInv) was also included in the model as a
proxy for R&D activities. Conventional tests of the time-series properties of the
three variables—TFP, Open, and MachInv—indicate that they are individually
integrated of order one.25 Thus, the long-run relationship among the variables was
estimated using the cointegration tests proposed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen
and Juselius (1990). 
The results from the Johansen tests (see Table 5) clearly indicate that there
exists one long-run cointegrating vector among TFP,  Open, and MachInv.
Moreover, restricted cointegration tests indicate that all three variables are indi-
vidually non-stationary;26 at the same time, all three variables contribute signif-
icantly to the cointegrating vector. In addition, the coefficients of the
cointegrating vector have the expected signs: TFP is positively related to Open
and MachInv.27 An examination of the speed of convergence coefficients (the
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24The regressions in Table 4 are not structural equations for factor accumulation and should therefore
be interpreted with caution. However, even after controlling for variables such as nominal and real wage
growth and labor productivity, the basic conclusion with regard to the  relationship between employment
growth and tariff reductions remains robust.  
25The results are reported in Jonsson and Subramanian (2000).
26It can be noted that these tests have stationarity as the null hypothesis, as opposed to the more
conventional Dickey-Fuller type of tests. Nevertheless, both tests indicate that it is appropriate to treat the
series as non-stationary.     
27One lag was included in the cointegration models. Although a visual inspection of the cointegrating
vector suggests that a time trend should be included in the model, a formal test rejected this hypothesis. alpha matrix) indicates that both TFP and Open are “error-correcting” whereas
MachInv can be treated as weakly exogenous. The absence of a weak
exogeneity result for Open implies that the estimation of a single first-differ-
ence equation with TFP as the dependent variable could be problematic.
However, as will be discussed below, this apparent absence of weak exogeneity
for the openness variable seems to be a small sample problem rather than a true
simultaneity problem, as various stability tests clearly show that only TFP is
error-correcting. 
Hence, in a second step, a single equation error-correction model was used to
examine the annual fluctuations in the variables (see Table 6). The fit of these
regressions was remarkably good, considering the small sample size. Moreover,
the estimated coefficients for both DOpen and DMachInv have the expected posi-
tive sign and are significant,28 while the estimated coefficient for the lagged error
correction term (EC) is negative, as expected, and significant. 
Recursive regressions show that the estimated coefficients in the error correc-
tion model are stable, and no trend breaks could be detected (see Figure 5a). These
results tend to support the case for treating the openness variable as weakly exoge-
nous. Indeed, recursive regressions using DOpen as a dependent variable show
that the estimated coefficient on the error-correction term is highly unstable and
Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
214
28The first lags of all variables were included in a first specification, but the estimated coefficients
were insignificant and the lags were dropped.
Table 4. Trade Liberalization and Factor Accumulation
(Pooled results, 1990–94 and 1994–98)
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth Capital Growth Growth in C/L
Constant –2.55 –3.04 6.15 7.61 8.93 10.94
[–2.69] [–2.72] [3.36] [4.21] [4.49] [4.91]
Dum9498 2.33 2.54 –0.22 –0.85 –2.84 –3.72
[2.73] [2.67] [–0.14] [–0.55] [–1.60] [–2.04]
CLR 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.00
[–0.93] [–1.08] [–1.65] [–1.41] [–1.17] [–0.87]
Exportshare –0.12 –0.12 0.22 0.22 0.37 0.37
[–3.55] [–3.52] [1.86] [1.93] [3.09] [3.22]
Importshare –0.02 –0.02 –0.11 –0.12 –0.09 –0.09
[–0.61] [–0.59] [–2.56] [–2.64] [–1.55] [–1.60]
DTariff –0.16 –0.32 0.27 0.75 0.44 1.10
[–3.06] [–1.78] [2.59] [2.90] [3.80] [3.23]
DTariff–sq 0.01 –0.03 –0.04
[1.02] [–1.83] [–2.04]
R-square 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.44
Number of obs. 48 48 48 48 48 48
Note: OLS estimations; the t-statistics (in brackets) are based on a heteroskedastic consistent





































































































Figure 4. South Africa: Time-Series Data, 1971–97
(Levels (solid lines) on left-hand scale; first-differences (dashed lines) on right-hand scale)Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
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Table 5. Cointegration Analysis of TFP , Openness, and Machinery Investment
Rank Eigenvalue Lambda Critical Value (95%) Trace Critical Value (95%)
r = 0  0.67 29.08** 21.0 36.92** 29.7
r <= 1 0.18 5.22 14.1 7.85 15.4
r <= 2 0.10 2.63 3.8 2.63 3.8
Notes: See Appendix for definitions of variables. * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypoth-






Tests for Stationarity of a Given Variable
TFP Open MachInv
Chi-sq (1) 25.53** 26.33** 8.98*
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Tests for Significance of a Given Variable
TFP Open MachInv
Chi-sq (1) 8.91** 7.59** 17.44**
p-value (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tests for Stationarity of Weak Exogeneity
TFP Open MachInv
Chi-sq (1) 9.77** 10.76** 0.30








97 95 93 91 89 87 85 83 81 79 77 75 73 1971
Cointegrating Vectorshifts sign over time, indicating that this variable is not really error-correcting but
rather should be treated as weakly exogenous (Figure 5b). We take these findings
as broadly supportive of the proposition that causation runs from increased open-
ness to higher TFP growth, rather than the converse. 
One potentially important problem with the short-run growth regressions is
the sensitivity of the measured level of TFP to the business cycle. For example, if
it is difficult to adjust the capital stock in the short run, and/or if the labor market
is inflexible, leading to labor hoarding behavior on the part of firms, the measured
level of productivity would be higher during booms and lower during recessions.
Such an omitted variable problem could, in turn, generate a simultaneity problem:
depending on the magnitude of the export and import elasticities, output fluctua-
tions related to the business cycle could lead to fluctuations in import and export
shares of GDP, that is, openness.
To deal with this problem, the change in capacity utilization in the manufac-
turing sector (DCapacity) was added as an independent variable in the error-
correction model. As expected, the estimated coefficient on this variable came out
positive and strongly significant, indicating that the growth rate in TFP in a
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Table 6. The Error-Correction Model: 
TFP Growth and Openness, 1971–97
Dependent Variable: DTFP
Constant 1.08 1.02 0.90
[2.29] [2.89] [2.47]
EC(–1)1 –0.26 –0.25 –0.22
[–2.29] [–2.89] [–2.46]
DOpen 0.34 0.27 0.32
[2.50] [2.60] [2.87]






DW-statistic 2.07 2.06 2.04
R-square 0.78 0.88 0.89
Number of obs. 25 25 25
Note: t-statistics in brackets.
1The error-correction term is derived from the cointegration relation among TFP, Open, and
MachInv.Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian
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EC(–1)
Figure 5a. DTFP as Dependent Variable
Figure 5b. DOpen as Dependent Variable
DOpen
DMachInv Chow test (5 percent critical value)
EC(–1) DTFP
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Figure 5. Stability Tests of Error-Correction Model
(Beta-coefficients ± 2 standard errors and Chow tests)particular year does not necessarily reflect an improvement in technology.29 Still,
the coefficients on DOpen and EC were virtually unaffected by the inclusion of
DCapacity. In contrast, the coefficient on DMachInv drops sharply and becomes
insignificant, suggesting that firms invest less in machinery and equipment during
recessions. Finally, a dummy variable for the period 1985–92, during which South
Africa was subject to trade and financial sanctions (Dum8592), was also included
in one specification, but did not turn out to be significant.
To summarize, the time-series evidence goes in the same direction as the
cross-sectional results: there exists a robust long-run relationship among TFP, the
degree of openness (measured as imports plus exports over GDP), and the share
of machinery and equipment investment in total investment. In addition, annual
growth in TFP is positively (and significantly) related to contemporaneous
changes in openness, and temporary deviations from the long-run relationship are
restored primarily by adjustments in the level of TFP, rather than through changes
in imports and exports or in investment in equipment and machinery. The quanti-
tative effects seem to be quite large: the estimated coefficients indicate that a 10
percentage point increase in openness is associated with an increase in TFP by
about 5 percent in the long run. Similarly, an increase in the share of machinery
and equipment investment of 10 percentage points is associated with an increase
in TFP by about 3 percent in the long run. 
V. Discussion and Conclusions
The proposition that trade is beneficial to dynamic efficiency (and not just to static
economic welfare) is theoretically ambiguous and the empirical evidence
supporting it has been questioned. In this paper, we have tested this proposition for
South Africa using a cross-section approach covering the manufacturing sectors
for the period 1990–98 when South Africa witnessed major trade reform, and an
aggregate time-series approach (covering the period 1970–97). Both approaches
validate the above proposition with a high degree of statistical reliability.
The results obtained in this paper indicate that trade liberalization has
contributed significantly to augmenting South Africa’s long-run growth potential
via its impact on TFP growth. For example, the average price reduction in the 1990s
due to the tariff changes was about 14 percent in manufacturing, which translates
to higher TFP growth of about 3 percent per year. The time-series analysis yields
surprisingly similar results; the openness ratio increased by about 3.2 percentage
points per year on average during the period 1990–97 which, according to our long-
run results, contributed to TFP growth of about 1.6 percent per year. The actual
annual growth in TFP between 1990–97 was 1.8 percent, implying that increased
openness accounted for close to 90 percent of the actual TFP growth in that period.
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29It should be noted that the variable Capacity was not included in the cointegration setup, as fluctu-
ations in this series would mainly be important in explaining short-run developments. Nevertheless, the
desirable statistical properties of the error correction model should be unaffected, since DCapacity clearly
is stationary. Other measures of the business cycle, including an indicator proposed by the Economics
Department of the South African Reserve Bank, generated qualitatively the same results.The high level of unemployment is, arguably, the most serious macroeco-
nomic problem in South Africa. A concern among policymakers and analysts has
been that trade liberalization could aggravate the unemployment problem, as firms
might reduce the size of the workforce to remain competitive. However, the results
in this study indicate that this concern is unfounded; employment has tended to
fall less in the sectors where tariffs have been reduced more aggressively. 
A comparison of the “footwear” and “chemical” sectors vividly illustrates this
point. The “footwear” sector employed 33,000 people in 1990 and was relatively
highly protected by an import tariff of 47 percent. The sector remained quite
protected during the 1990s, as the tariff was reduced to only 34 percent by 1998.
Despite this continued protection, employment fell on average by 5 percent per
year to 22,000 by 1998. Moreover, total factor productivity fell on average by 1.9
percent per year, and value added fell on average by 5.1 percent per year. In
contrast, the sector “other chemical products” employed 64,000 people in 1990,
and the tariff was 29 percent. By 1998, the tariff had been slashed to 5 percent.
Nevertheless, employment had increased on average by 1 percent per year to
68,000, and, at the same time, the sector had improved its efficiency: total factor
productivity increased on average by 1.3 percent per year, while value added grew
on average by 2.6 percent per year.
The time-series results regarding the joint importance of the openness and the
technology variable draw attention to two key and complementary channels of
influence on the economy’s productivity. While R&D, as embodied in investment
in machinery and equipment, augments productivity, it also appears to be impor-
tant to provide an open or liberal environment in which the gains from R&D can
be maximized. A policy corollary of this finding could be that emphasis on
increasing an economy’s access to foreign capital goods—by, say, selectively
liberalizing imports of capital goods—might be insufficient to harness the benefits
from technology absorption. By the same token, the results suggest that an open
environment needs to be complemented by appropriate avenues for the creation
and absorption of technology.
While we find the results in this paper encouraging, there remains consider-
able scope for refining and deepening the research agenda. In particular, it would
be interesting to explore the impact of trade liberalization at plant-level. Plant-
level data exist for the manufacturing sector (in the form of the manufacturing
census) for 1991 and 1993 and those for 1996 were expected to be released in
2000. These would constitute a rich data set for examining issues related to trade,
concentration, and efficiency, as has been done for Turkey (Levinsohn, 1992) and
Côte d’Ivoire (Harrison, 1994).
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Data Description and Sources













Annual average of growth in
real value added in a sector
minus the factor share
weighted growth in capital
stock and employment;
factor share is in nominal
terms.
Exports divided by
production (in current prices).
Imports divided by domestic
consumption (in current
prices).
Sum of statutory tariffs and
import surcharges. 
Change in tariff divided by 1
plus initial tariff.
Dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 for the period
1994–98 and 0 otherwise.
Export subsidy.









Belli, Finger, and Ballivian
(1993) for tariff data for
1990; IDC for tariff data for
1994 and 1998; and GATT
(1993) for import surcharge
data.




1The data refer to the following 24 International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
three-digit subsectors within the manufacturing sector: food processing, beverages, textiles,
clothing, leather, footwear, wood and wood products, furniture, paper and paper products, printing
and publishing, basic chemicals, other chemical products, rubber products, plastic products, glass
and glass products, other nonmetallic minerals, basic iron and steel, basic non-ferrous metals, metal
products, machinery and equipment, electrical machinery, motor vehicles, transport equipment, and
other manufacturing.REFERENCES
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